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CORPORATE LAW
A. Eric Kauders, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite its widely held reputation as being a bastion of all things
conservative, Virginia has long been a leader on the frontier of
corporate and partnership law. As a recent example confirming its
progressive reputation, one need look no further than the 1991
passage of legislation permitting the formation of limited liability
companies.' While the amount of activity in corporate law this year
was far from notable, the legislation and judicial decisions from the
past year continue to demonstrate Virginia's "corporate activism."
Part II of this article discusses the changes made to section 13.1
of the Virginia Code, which governs the creation and operation of
corporations, partnerships, and limited liability companies.2 Most
significantly, the General Assembly continued to recognize the
powerful role technology in general, and the Internet in particular,
plays now in corporate governance and the impact it will surely
have in the future. Among the more notable bills introduced was
language that permitted notification of and proxy voting in share-
holder meetings to be conducted by electronic means.3 With this
legislation, Virginia leapt to the forefront in corporate governance
and regulation and continued the strong message that Virginia
welcomes the birth of what has come to be known as the "Silicon
Dominion."
Part III of this article covers the significant developments in case
law during the past year from Virginia's courts. While the Supreme
* Associate, McGuire, Woods, Battle & Boothe, L.L.P., Richmond, Virginia. B.A.,
1991, College of William and Mary; J.D., 1994, University of Virginia School of Law.
1. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-1000 to -1073 (Repl. Vol. 1993). Virginia was among the
first states to provide for limited liability companies as an alternative for asset protection in
comparison to the more traditional forms of organization seen in corporations and limited
liability partnerships.
2. Each of the legislative changes took effect July 1, 1999, unless otherwise noted.
Surprisingly, there were no amendments to chapter 50 of the Virginia Code, which governs
partnerships in the commonwealth, d ning the 1999 session of the General Assembly.
3. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-847 (Repl. Vol. 1999).
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Court of Virginia largely ignored issues of corporate governance and
operations this term, the circuit courts issued a number of opinions
that may have a significant impact on corporations, partnerships,
and limited liability companies. Among these are decisions dealing
with the right of a corporation to bring suit under the name of its
predecessor when that name may not have been a valid corporate
appellation,4 the deposition of corporate parties who live and work
in jurisdictions outside of Virginia,5 and the right of shareholders
not of record to bring derivative suits against or on behalf of the
corporation, which was a case of first impression in Virginia.6 In all,
these well-reasoned decisions reflect a pocket of pragmatic innova-
tion within an environment of more traditional and conservative
corporate jurisprudence that combine well to foster and promote
business in Virginia.
II. LEGISLATION
A. Corporate Action Without Shareholder Notice
Article 8 of the Virginia Stock Corporation Act (the "Stock Act")
was amended this year to allow shareholders to take any of the
various activities "required or permitted" by the Stock Act at a
shareholders' meeting7 without prior notice, as long as each of the
shareholders entitled to vote on the action participates in that
action.' This amendment is a practical recognition that notice to
shareholders of a corporation's activities is duplicative and serves
no useful purpose if each of the shareholders himself participates in
that action. In practice, of course, this provision is targeted at, and
will be used almost exclusively by, small and closely held corpora-
tions where the number of consenting shareholders is sufficiently
small enough to make such coordination sensible and economical.
The amendment further provides that, in such cases where corpo-
4. See Doug Discount Roofing Co. v. Reliable Builders, Inc., 45 Va. Cir. 81 (Norfolk City
1997).
5. See Staples Corp. v. Washington Hall Corp., 44 Va. Cir. 372 (Fairfax County 1998).
6. See Milstead v. Bradshaw, 43 Va. Cir. 428 (Norfolk City 1997).
7. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-707 (Repl. Vol. 1993) (providing for shareholder
approval of amendments to articles of incorporation and corporate bylaws); id. § 13.1-718
(Repl. Vol. 1993) (providing for shareholder approval of mergers and share exchanges); id. §
13.1-728.5 (Repl. Vol. 1993) (providing for shareholder approval of control share acquisitions);
id. § 13.1-742 (Repl. Vol. 1993) (providing for shareholder approval of corporate dissolution).
8. See id. § 13.1-657(A)(1) (Repl. Vol. 1999). This provision previously permitted action
to be taken without a meeting of shareholders. See id. § 13.1-657(A) (Repl. Vol. 1993).
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rate activities authorized by all of the voting shareholders are
undertaken, no action by the board of directors is required.9
Even those companies not considered public by the Stock Act"0
can take such actions without either a meeting or prior notice of
such a meeting if the "action is taken by shareholders who would be
entitled to vote" and if that group of shareholders has, in effect,
control of the minimum number of votes required for approval of
that action." If, however, action is to be taken by the corporation by
any means other than unanimous consent of the shareholders
eligible to vote, then the corporation must provide written notice to
each of the eligible shareholders at least five days in advance. 2
B. Electronic Meeting Notification and Voting
Virginia joined the ranks of only a handful of other states this
year when it passed one of the first laws aimed at limiting the
exposure that companies may face because of liabilities related to
Y2K computer problems. 3
This sensitivity toward the changes and effects that technology
has on the business community also led the General Assembly to
permit large corporations' 4 to notify shareholders of meetings by
electronic means-most notably by e-mail-rather than by the more
traditional method of written notification sent by first-class mail. 5
This measure, which could save corporations significant amounts of
money in shareholder meeting expenses, is conditioned only upon
certification by the shareholders that they authorize the delivery of
such notices by electronic transmission. 6 As a complementary
provision, the Virginia Code now permits shareholders to vote their
shares by proxy through a number of means, including "telegram,
9. See id. § 13.1-657(A)(1) (Repl. Vol. 1999).
10. The amendments provide that corporations are considered "public" if they have 300
or more shareholders. See id. § 13.1-657(E) (Repl. Vol. 1999).
11. Id. § 13.1-657(A)(2) (Repl. Vol. 1999).
12. See id. § 13.1-657(D) (Repl. Vol. 1999).
13. See id. § 8.01-227.1 to -227.3 (Cum. Supp. 1999). The Y2K computer problem is
caused by a computer's inability to process date and time data because it codes years as two
digits instead of four digits (i.e., "99" instead of"1999"). Thus, when computers are asked to
process dates for the year 2000, for instance, they read "00" as being the year 1900 and not
the year 2000.
14. Large corporations are those with 300 or more shareholders of record. See id. § 13.1-
658(G) (Repl. Vol. 1999).
15. See id.
16. See id.
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cablegram or other means of electronic transmission." 7 Once again,
"electronic transmission" is merely a euphemism for e-mail notifica-
tion to the company of how a shareholder wishes to vote his or her
shares at the shareholders' meeting. Before this provision was
enacted, the Virginia Code allowed shareholders to vote by proxy
only upon execution of an appointment form properly submitted to
the corporate secretary. 18
III. JUDICIAL DECISIONS
A. Oppression of Minority Shareholders
In Stickley v. Stickley,"9 the Rockingham County Circuit Court
delivered a detailed opinion that discussed the legal standard for
and circumstances supporting a decision to place a corporation into
receivership and dissolve it when the majority shareholder operated
the corporation in a manner that was found to be oppressive to the
minority shareholder.2"
The plaintiff in the suit was a minority shareholder who owned
thirty-five percent of the stock of J.O. Stickley and Son, Inc., and
requested that the corporation be dissolved and its affairs wound up
pursuant to Virginia Code section 13.1-747.1 In the alternative, the
plaintiff requested that the court find that a sale of the corporate
operating assets in 1995 to be a sale of substantially all of the
corporation's property pursuant to Virginia Code sections 13.1-724
and -730, thereby entitling the plaintiff, as a minority shareholder,
to an appraisal and a redemption of his stock.22 The court found
that the majority shareholder, acting with family members, turned
the corporation "into an engine of oppression" and "conducted the
corporate affairs in a manner designed to oppress the minority
shareholder."23 Therefore, the court ruled that the corporation
would be put in the hands of a receiver for liquidation. 4
17. Id. § 13.1-847(B)(2) (Repl. Vol. 1999). A faxed copy or "other reliable reproduction"
of the proxy designation is also now permitted to be used in lieu of the original writing, as
long asit is a complete copy of the original. See id. § 13.1-847(B)(3) (Repl. Vol. 1999).
18. See id. § 13.1-847(B), (C) (Repl. Vol. 1993).
19. 43 Va. Cir. 123 (Rockingham County 1997).
20. See id. at 149.
21. See id. at 123 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-747 (Repl. Vol. 1993)).
22. See id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-724, -730 (Repl. Vol. 1993)).
23. Id. at 143.
24. See id.
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Proceedings under Virginia Code section 13.1-747 are supplemen-
tal to the rights that minority shareholders enjoy in common law
and in the statutes governing shareholder relationships.' The
circuit court noted that the word "oppressive," as used in the
statute, does not necessarily "'carry an essential inference of
imminent disaster,'" nor is it synonymous with illegal or fraudulent
behavior." Rather, the circuit court has held oppressive to mean
"'a visible departure from the standards of fair dealing, and a
violation of fair play on which every shareholder who entrusts his
money to a company is entitled to rely,'" and "a lack of probity and
fair dealing in the affairs of a company to the prejudice of some of its
members.'"27
The circuit court noted that "t]ypical examples of improper
conduct are excessive compensation, improper related party
transactions, and inadequate dividends paid to stockholders.""
The circuit court found that a more blatant example of openly
oppressive conduct, marked by "a total lack of probity and breach of
fiduciary duty," could not be found in what was presented by the
facts of this case.29 Among other things, the majority shareholder
refused to produce the corporation's books, financial information,
and records to the minority shareholder; unilaterally changed the
terms of corporate notes held by the minority shareholder by
lowering the interest rates and the term of payment; converted
corporate assets for the majority shareholder's personal benefit;
negotiated to sell all or a majority of the corporation's assets as a
way to deprive the minority shareholder of any ownership interest;
stacked the corporate board with other family members to ensure
that there would be no independent investigation of any facts or
corporate decisions; and payed the majority shareholder an
unreasonable level ofcompensation given the work he performed for
the corporation.30 Because the majority shareholder "devised a way
by which he could dispose of all the combined [corporate] assets
without ever having to submit to a vote or a buy-out of the minority
25. See E. F. White and P. W. Oil Co. v. Perkins, 213 Va. 129, 134-35, 189 S.E.2d 315,319
(1972).
26. Stickley, 43 Va. Cir. at 144-45 (quoting Brown v. Scott County Tobacco Warehouses,
Inc., 5 Va. Cir. 75, 78 (Scott County 1983)).
27. Id. at 145 (quoting Brown, 5 Va. Cir. at 78) (citations omitted).
28. Id. at 146 (citing Giannotti v. Hamway, 239 Va. 14, 24, 382 S.E.2d 725, 731 (1990)).
29. Id. at 147.
30. See id. at 147-48.
1999] 845
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stockholder," the court dissolved the corporation and put it into
receivership to wind up and liquidate the corporation.3'
B. Corporate Dissolution
An action seeking a corporate dissolution must be sought by the
corporation's board of directors, a creditor, or a shareholder, and not
the corporation itself. 2 In Eastern Industrial Services, Inc. v. Lee,
the plaintiff corporation sought its own dissolution in conjunction
with an accounting under Virginia Code section 8.01-31.33 The
defendant demurred, asserting that there can be no dissolution
because no shareholder or other eligible party initiated the dissolu-
tion proceedings against the company. 4 The circuit court agreed
and held that while it is "certainly proper" to join other sharehold-
ers, the corporation must be the defendant in a shareholder-
initiated dissolution under Virginia Code section 13.1-747.35
C. Proper Corporate Name For Bringing Suit
In Rockwell v. Allman, 6 the Supreme Court of Virginia was
presented with a personal injuries suit for damages where the
plaintiffinadvertently failed to serve the administrator of the estate
of the driver who caused the accident. The supreme court upheld
the trial court's entry of summary judgment because the named
defendant, who was not a valid administrator of the decedent's
estate, was the wrong person to be sued, rather than just a misno-
mer." "A misnomer is a mistake in name, but not person. Here, the
wrong person was named and it cannot be corrected under [the
statute] by labeling it a misnomer."39
A recent opinion delivered by the Norfolk City Circuit Court
addressed a similar issue. In Doug Discount Roofing Co. v. Reliable
Builders, Inc.,4 the question presented was whether a corporation
has the right to sue in its corporate name for any debts owed to its
31. Id. at 148-49.
32. See Eastern Indus. Serv., Inc. v. Lee, 43 Va. Cir. 252, 253 (Amherst County 1997).
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See id. at 255.
36. 211 Va. 560, 179 S.E.2d 471 (1971) (per curiam).
37. See id. at 561, 179 S.E.2d at 472.
38. See id.
39. Id.
40. 45 Va. Cir. 81 (Norfolk City 1997).
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predecessor when the corporation was not entitled to use that name
at the time it allegedly entered into the contract.4' The defendant
demurred, claiming that the plaintiff was neither "a corporation
registered by the Virginia State Corporation Commission nor
licensed to do business in the Commonwealth, nor [was] that name
registered as a fictitious name for some other entity."42 The
defendant argued, therefore, that the plaintiff had no standing or
basis, either in contract or otherwise, to sue the defendant in its
motion for judgment.4"
While the facts were somewhat in dispute at the time of the
circuit court's opinion, it appears that the contract between the
parties was executed in 1993 and carried the signature of James D.
Lundy under the heading "Doug's Discount Roofing, Inc., by: James
D. Lundy."' Not only did the parties agree that the plaintiffs name
in the contract and in the suit papers differed by the absence of an
"'s," but the parties also agreed that the plaintiff had incorporated
as Doug Discount Roofing Company, Inc., in 1995, well after the
contract was executed and the work was completed under the
contract.45
The circuit court noted that while the plaintiff did not enjoy the
right to use its corporate name at the time the contract was formed,
it did use that name in the contract itself.46 The court set aside for
later consideration the issue of whether the contract signed by Mr.
Lundy, "purportedly as president of the corporation, but of a
corporation that did not exist at that time," was a valid contract in
light of the corporation's lack of official status at the time.47
Instead, the court analogized the facts before it with those presented
in Rockwell and in Jacobson v. Southern Biscuit Co.,' which
discussed the distinction between misnomer and mistakes in
person.49 The circuit court concluded the "corporate successor" to
Mr. Lundy's sole proprietorship roofing business was the corpora-
tion that he formed in 1995, and held that a corporation has the
41. See id. at 82.
42. Id. at 81-82.
43. See id. at 82.
44 Id.
45. See id. at 83.
46. See id. at 85.
47. Id. at 89.
48. 198 Va. 813, 97 S.E.2d 1 (1957).
49.. See Doug Discount, 45 Va. Cir. at 87-88.
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right to bring suit on any debt owed to its predecessor in the
corporate name."°
D. Deposition of Corporate Party
In Staples Corp. v. Washington Hall Corp.,51 the parties were
involved in litigation over an alleged breach of contract to sell real
property located in Reston, Virginia.52 The Fairfax County Circuit
Court was presented with the defendant's motion to preclude the
plaintiff from orally deposing two corporate officers of the defen-
dant, and deposing a designated agent of defendant pursuant to
Rule 4:5(b)(6) under the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia."
Staples Corp. ("Staples") had previously noticed the oral depositions
of two individuals who were officers of the corporate defendant, but
not parties to the suit, and who resided and worked in Japan.54
Staples noticed these depositions even though it previously deposed
one of the defendant's agents who, it was stipulated, would be
designated as a Rule 4:5(b)(6) representative by the defendant.55
Several of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia govern the
procedures by which a party may pursue discovery of opposing
parties and third parties. Rule 4:5(a) permits any party to "take the
testimony of any person, including a party, by deposition upon oral
examination" after the commencement of the action.56 The rule later
provides that if the deponent is a party to the lawsuit, the examina-
tion is to take place in the locality where the suit is pending. 57
Where the deponent is a nonparty, the rule requires that the
depositions be taken where the witness "resides, is employed, or has
his principle place of business" unless the parties agree or where the
court orders otherwise.58 For any nonparty witnesses who do not
reside in Virginia, depositions are to be taken "in the locality where
he resides or is employed or at any other location agreed upon by the
parties."59
50. See id. at 88.
51. 44 Va. Cir. 372 (Fairfax County 1998).
52. See id. at 372.
53. See id.
54. See id. at 373; see also VA. SUP. CT. R. 4:1, :5.
55. See Staples, 44 Va. Cir. at 374, 378.
56. VA. Sup. CT. R. 4:5(a).
57. See id. at 4:5(al).
58. Id.
59. Id.
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Of course, a party can also take the deposition of a corporation
pursuant to Rule 4:5(b)(6), which states that these terms do "not
preclude taking a deposition by any other procedure authorized in
these Rules."6 ° Under this rule, the examining party designates the
subject matter of the examination and the corporation to be
examined designates a representative to testify on its behalf.61
In Staples, the defendant argued that the depositions of its two
corporate officers must take place, if at all, in Japan because the
individuals were not parties to the case and because Rule 4:5(al)
mandates that nonparty witness depositions are to be taken in the
locality where that witness works or resides.62 The court, however,
disagreed and stated that the defendant's officers can be deposed as
"party" witnesses under Rule 4:5(al) because they are officers of a
party to a lawsuit.63 Moreover, the court held that, despite the
enactment of Rule 4:5(b)(6), an examining party is entitled to
designate specific officers, directors, or managing agents to testify
on behalf of a corporate entity that is a party to a lawsuit.
6 4
On the question as to where these witnesses should be deposed,
the court held that Rules 4:7(a)(3) and 4:12(b) "manifest an intent
by the Virginia Supreme Court to treat officers, directors, and
managing agents selected to testify on behalf of a corporate litigant
by the examining party as 'party' witnesses for the purposes of Rule
4:5(al). 65 Rule 4:7(a)(3) provides that the deposition for any person
"who at the time of taking the deposition was an officer, director or
managing agent" of a corporate party to the litigation can be used
by an adverse party for any purpose.66 Rule 4:12(b)(2) provides that
whenever an "officer, director, or managing agent of a party" refuses
to testify or permit discovery, that party may be sanctioned as a
result.6" The court concluded that based on this language, it would
defy logic to hold the defendant liable for discovery sanctions if, as
the defendant argued, the witness failing to testify was a nonparty
witness.6 Based on this analysis, the court concluded that "individ-
uals designated to testify on behalf of a corporate litigant by the
examining party constitute the equivalent of party witnesses for
60. Id. at 4.5(b)(6).
61. See id.
62. See Staples, 44 Va. Cir. at 374.
63. See id. at 374-75.
64. See id. at 374, 377.
65. Id. at 377.
66. VA. Sup. CT. R. 4:7(a)(3).
67. Id. at 4:12(b)(2).
68. See Staples, 44 Va. Cir. at 377.
1999]
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purposes of Rule 4:5(al)."69 This assumes, of course, that such
designees are either officers, directors, or managing agents of the
corporate deponent.7" The court ordered that the two officers of the
defendant party could be deposed and that their depositions should
take place in Fairfax County, Virginia.7'
E. Officer and Director Employment
In Nida v. Business Advisory Systems, Inc.,72 a former officer and
director of the defendant brought suit for commissions he claimed
were due from the defendant and that were derived from the course
of his employment there.73 The defendant filed a counterclaim
against the plaintiff claiming, inter alia, breach of fiduciary duty,
tortious interference, conspiracy, and breach of contract.74 The
plaintiff, Thomas A. Nida, was hired by the defendant as a loan
officer and later appointed as an officer and director of the corpora-
tion.75 The litigation began as a result of the defendant's declining
business and the plaintiffs subsequent search for alternate
employment.76 The plaintiff eventually established a competing
business several weeks after he left the defendant's employ.77
Addressing the defendant's counterclaim for breach of fiduciary
duty, the court found that although "'the officers and directors of a
going solvent corporation cannot engage in a competing business to
the detriment of the corporation which they represent,' a former
officer or director is not precluded from forming and engaging in a
competing business, absent an enforceable covenant not to
compete."7" Noting that the plaintiff "did about all he could under
the circumstances to sever his relationship with [the defendant]
before forming" his new company, the court held that his only
remaining connection with the defendant, his former employer, was
the plaintiffs independent contractor agreement.7" Nothing in the
69. Id.
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. 44 Va. Cir. 487 (Winchester City 1998).
73. See id. at 487.
74. See id.
75. See id. at 488.
76. See id. at 490-94.
77. See id. at 488-89.
78. Id. at 495 (quoting 18(b) AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 1712 (1985)).
79. Id. at 496.
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agreement prevented the plaintiff from leaving the defendant's
employment to engage in a competing business."
Although the plaintiffs independent contractor agreement
contained a provision that purported to restrict the time in which he
could engage in competing business against the defendant, the court
held that it was not enforceable because it was "not limited to a
reasonable geographic area."" Relying on the criteria set out in New
River Media Group, Inc. v. Knighton, 2 the court evaluated the
validity and enforceability of a noncompetition agreement.83 The
trial court found a complete lack of reference to a geographic area;
therefore, if the noncompetition clause were enforced, it would
effectively prohibit the plaintiff from competing with the defendant
anywhere on the face of the earth.84
Although the trial court acknowledged that Virginia law allows
courts to sever objectionable contract language and maintain the
remainder of the contract as enforceable, it distinguished between
that conduct and conduct that amounted to rewriting a contract for
the parties.8 5 Because the court held that the noncompete provisions
of the parties' contract were unenforceable as written and "Virginia
courts do not rewrite the parties [sic] contract for them," the trial
court struck the offending language from the contract and held that
the plaintiff was free from his fiduciary and contractual bonds with
the defendant, thus enabling him to engage in competitive activities
against it.86
F. Shareholders' Right to Employment
In Summers v. Viamac, Inc., 7 the plaintiff, who was a director,
officer, employee, and minority shareholder of the defendant
corporation, sued for corporate dissolution of the defendant.88
Shortly after the plaintiff was terminated from his employment, the
defendant's president and majority stockholder offered to purchase
the plaintiffs shares at a price that the plaintiff considered too
80. See id.
81. Id. at 497.
82. 245 Va. 367, 371, 429 S.E.2d 25, 26 (1993).
83. See Nida, 44 Va. Cir. at 497-98.
84. See id. at 497-99.
85. See id. at 498 (citing Grant v. Carotek, Inc., 737 F.2d 410, 411 (4th Cir. 1984); Roto-
Die Co. v. Lesser, 899 F. Supp. 1515, 1519 (W.D. Va. 1995)).
86. Id.
87. 45 Va. Cir. 201 (Salem City 1998).
88. See id. at 201.
19991
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low.89 For that reason, the plaintiffmaintained the offer constituted
corporate oppression as set forth in Virginia Code section 13.1-747.9o
The plaintiff claimed that his rights as a stockholder had been
expanded from what a stockholder traditionally enjoys, such as
proportionate ownership in the corporation, a voice in running the
business, and a proportionate share of the corporate profits. 91
Distinguishing this case from other decisions where the right to
employment was enforced because corporate profits were distributed
to shareholders in the form of salary, the trial court held that
"guaranteed employment is not an incident of stock ownership."92
Further, the court noted that when the plaintiffpurchased his stock,
he "entered into agreements concerning his rights as a stockholder,
his rights as an employee, and his rights to compete with his
employer. Each right was treated as separate and distinct.""
Because the plaintiff, at the time of his termination, was an at-will
employee, his employment relationship was independent and
distinct from each of those other rights and was not incident to his
stock ownership in the defendant corporation. 9
G. Shareholder Ability to File Derivative Suit
In Milstead v. Bradshaw,9 the Norfolk City Circuit Court
pioneered new ground in Virginia when it held that a woman who
had a mere equitable ownership interest in shares of corporate stock
could maintain a derivative suit against the corporation on behalf
of other shareholders.96 By all accounts, this was a case of first
impression in the Commonwealth, although the court relied on
persuasive authority from a number of other courts and jurisdic-
tions.97
Derivative suits are equitable devices available to shareholders
to protect against abuses occasioned "by the corporation, its
directors, officers, and controlling shareholders."98 Generally,
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. Id. at 202.
93. Id.
94. See id. at 203. The court did note that his "status as an owner of corporate stock is
undiminished by his termination" of employment. Id.
95. 43 Va. Cir. 428 (Norfolk City 1997).
96. See id. at 433.
97. See id. at 430-35.
98. Id. at 429.
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derivative suits are used for two purposes: (i) to "compel the
corporation to sue upon a right of action," and (ii) to bring suit on
behalf of the corporation against those who are liable to the
corporation.9 Derivative suits provide an exception to the general
rule that shareholders have no standing to prosecute an action in
the name of the corporation.'
The problem in Milstead was that the plaintiff was not a
shareholder of record and, therefore, did not have standing to sue
under the explicit terms of the Virginia corporation statutes. 10
Instead, the plaintiff maintained that she obtained an equitable
ownership interest in shares of the defendant corporation when her
final divorce decree was executed by her and her then husband and
entered by the circuit court.0 2 The divorce decree incorporated the
couple's settlement agreement and provided that she would receive
100 shares of the defendant corporation. 0 3 Because the separation
agreement and the final decree created a "contractual expectancy in
the 100 shares of stock," the plaintiff claimed that she had an
equitable ownership interest in the shares.'0 4 The court agreed.'0 5
The next issue presented to the court was whether someone with
merely an equitable ownership interest in a corporation's shares,
rather than someone with actual record ownership of shares, could
bring a derivative suit on behalf of the other shareholders.0 6 The
court held that Virginia Code section 13.1-603 could be construed to
permit such a suit.0 7 After discussing the governance structure
offered by other states that recognize standing in such "equitable
shareholders" or persons with beneficial interests'08 and comparing
99. Id
100. See id.; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-672.1(B) (Repl. Vol. 1993).
101. See Milstead, 43 Va. Cir. at 431. While the plaintiff obviously was not a holder of the
actual shares, she maintained that her final divorce decree was a nominee certificate under
the terms defined in Virginia Code section 13.1-603. See id. Because the corporation did not
issue the "nominee certificate," however, and because the "certificate" was not on file with the
corporation, the court concluded "that Milstead does not qualify as a 'shareholder' using this
theory under Virginia law because she is not a beneficial owner of shares to the extent of the
rights granted by a nominee certificate on file with [the] corporation." Id.; see also VA. CODE
ANN. § 13.1-664 (Repl. Vol. 1993).
102. See Milstead, 43 Va. Cir. at 431.
103. See id. at 432, 437.
104. Id at 432.
105. See id. at 431-32.
106. See id. at 432.
107. See id.
108. Among these states are Florida, West Virginia, and Delaware. See DEL. CODEANN.
tit. 8 § 327 (1998); FLA. STAT ANN. §§ 607.07401(1), (7) (West 1993); W. VA. CODE § 31-1-103
(1995); Shilling v. Erwin, 888 F. Supp. 236 (S.D. W.Va. 1995) (quoting Felsenheld v. Bloch
1999] 853
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them to Virginia's scheme, 09 the court stated that public policy
allowed equitable owners of shares the opportunity to enforce
corporate rights on behalf of themselves and other shareholders." 0
In short, the court's reasoning revolved around the purpose behind
requiring only shareholders to prosecute actions on behalf of the
corporation."' If the rule were otherwise, it would be possible for
people to purchase shares of stock in order to bring an action to
"attack a transaction which occurred prior to the purchase of
stock."" 2 Limiting the right to bring a derivative suit only to those
who were shareholders-actual, beneficial or otherwise-prevents the
opportunism of "subsequent purchasers of shares [who] could reap
a windfall from any recovery in a derivative suit which was not
considered in the purchase price of their shares."" 3 Furthermore,
a rule that would deny beneficial or equitable shareholders the right
to bring derivative suits may "lead to an inequitable result since
there may be no other shareholders willing to bring a derivative
suit."
1 14
Considering the facts before it, the court held that because the
plaintiff came into her beneficial ownership of the shares by
operation of law and not for the purpose of establishing standing to
bring the derivative suit, her status did not frustrate the purpose
behind Virginia's statute defining who has standing to bring such a
suit." 5 Moreover, the court found that the corporation's other
shareholders would be unlikely to bring a derivative suit themselves
if the plaintiff was not permitted to bring her suit."' As such, the
court held that on the basis of the facts presented, the Virginia Code
permits shareholders with equitable ownership interests in the
corporation to bring a derivative action." 7
Bros. Tobacco Co., 119 W. Va. 167, 192 S.E. 545 (1937)); Jones v. Taylor, 348 A.2d 188 (Del
Ch. 1975); Provence v. Palm Beach Taverns, Inc., 676 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
109. See Milstead, 43 Va. Cir. at 432 (comparing FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 607.07401(1), (7) (West
1993) with VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-603, -672.1 (Repl. Vol. 1993 & Cum. Supp. 1997)).
110. See id. at 432-34.
111. See id. at 434.
112. Id. (quoting Jones, 348 A.2d at 191).
113. Id. (citing 13 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW
OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5981 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1995 & Cum. Supp. 1996)).
114. Id. at 434 (citing Jones, 348 A-2d at 192).
115. See id. at 435; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-671.1 (Repl. Vol. 1993 & Cum. Supp.
1997).
116. See Milstead, 43 Va. Cir. at 435.
117. See id. at 437; see also VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-603, -672.1 (Repl. Vol. 1993 & Cum.
Supp. 1997).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Virginia's "corporate activism" may have been tempered this year
in terms of volume of legislation, but the courts have provided a
number of useful, pragmatic, and progressive opinions to help
business entities compete in the next century. While some may
lament the General Assembly's failure to seize the reins of progres-
sive change with greater vigor in 1999, it must be remembered that
the demands of electric power deregulation required a huge
commitment of time and resources in the General Assembly this
year. And, while a pioneering vision of the next century's business
structure may attract businesses and stimulate their growth and
competitiveness, a chief hallmark of a healthy business environment
is also an air of stability. This is merely to say that progressive
action for its own sake is not, and never has been, an earmark of the
Virginia courts or legislature. Rather, time-tested methods and
philosophies, coupled with an eye toward the pragmatic and a
healthy respect for changes brought by innovation, all combine to
create an environment where business can flourish.
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